非流行版巴菲特語(yǔ)錄互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+
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反思很多一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)投資亂象
反思很多一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)投資亂象
一年一度的伯克希爾哈撒韋股東大會(huì)5月份馬上就要在奧馬哈小鎮(zhèn)召開(kāi)了，國(guó)內(nèi)已經(jīng)活生生地把去奧馬哈參會(huì)做成了一個(gè)旅游項(xiàng)目，但發(fā)完朋友圈之后，又能有幾個(gè)人真正去領(lǐng)悟巴菲特投資的精髓？付諸實(shí)踐的人估計(jì)更是寥寥無(wú)幾。
最近讀了一本書(shū)叫University of Berkshire Hathaway，直譯就是《伯克希爾大學(xué)》，是作者Daniel Pecaut和Corey Wrenn過(guò)去30年參加伯克希爾股東年會(huì)的筆記。書(shū)里面記錄了大量巴菲特和芒格的語(yǔ)錄，流傳度完全不如那些雞湯語(yǔ)句，但句句珠璣。我又從這本筆記里翻譯了一些精華，跟大家分享，希望有助于我們反思很多一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)投資亂象，幫助我們更好地去做長(zhǎng)線投資。
PS. 英文好的同學(xué)還是直接讀原文，我的翻譯也做不到原汁原味。
We’ve had a very low opinion of our abilities.
我們認(rèn)為我們的能力很一般。
旁注：國(guó)內(nèi)很多普通投資人覺(jué)得自己很厲害。
The worst mistakes are made from the nicest graphs and what is really needed is enlightened common sense.
最糟糕的錯(cuò)誤往往從最漂亮的圖表得來(lái)，但其實(shí)真正需要的只是啟發(fā)性的常識(shí)。
旁注：經(jīng)常有人做個(gè)很漂亮的PPT，驚艷的圖表，最后要么騙別人、要么把自己繞進(jìn)去了。但卻忽視了真相往往只是常識(shí)的一個(gè)組合。
Knowing your limitations and the limitations of your information seems to be the key.
徹底了解自己的局限和自己所獲取信息的局限，這看起來(lái)是投資的關(guān)鍵。
旁注：很多人既不了解自己知道什么，更不了解自己不知道什么。
It’s hard enough to understand the culture you’ve been raised in, much less someone else’s.
想深入了解自己本土的文化已經(jīng)夠難了，更別說(shuō)別人的了。
旁注：現(xiàn)在有不少人去別的國(guó)家創(chuàng)業(yè)和投資，我覺(jué)得如果不是想做時(shí)間差的套利，而是做一些跟當(dāng)?shù)匚幕⑾⑾嚓P(guān)的領(lǐng)域，須謹(jǐn)慎。
We’d buy great businesses with excellent management at a fair to bargain price and leave them alone.
我們喜歡以一個(gè)公平、不錯(cuò)的價(jià)格去買已經(jīng)有優(yōu)秀管理團(tuán)隊(duì)的偉大生意，之后讓其獨(dú)立發(fā)展。
旁注：阿斗是永遠(yuǎn)扶不起的，投資人也幾乎不可能扭轉(zhuǎn)一家公司的局面。永遠(yuǎn)都只投可以自己解決自己?jiǎn)栴}的公司，融不到錢也要繼續(xù)想辦法前進(jìn)的創(chuàng)始人。
For the man with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.
對(duì)一個(gè)拿著錘子的人來(lái)說(shuō)，每個(gè)問(wèn)題看起來(lái)都像一枚釘子。
Buffett said that they know how to evaluate businesses. They do not know how to predict market swings. “It is crazy to give up something you know for something you do not.”
巴菲特說(shuō)他們知道如何去衡量一個(gè)生意，但不知道如何預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)的波動(dòng)。“為了一些你不知道的事情而放棄你所知道的事情，這太瘋狂了！”
旁注：不要嘗試去預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)，專注于如何去衡量目標(biāo)公司的內(nèi)在價(jià)值。
To think about what will happen versus when is a far more efficient way to behave.
去思考將會(huì)發(fā)生什么比什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生要有效率得多。
Diversification makes no sense for someone who knows what they are doing.
分散投資對(duì)于知道自己到底在投什么的人來(lái)說(shuō)是沒(méi)有任何意義的。
Three wonderful businesses is more than you need in this life and would serve you much better than 100 average businesses.
一輩子能投到3家很棒的公司比投100家一般的公司要強(qiáng)很多。
旁注：巴菲特其實(shí)是非常激進(jìn)的，他敢于在自己有把握的公司上下重注。如果用德州撲克的玩家類型去評(píng)價(jià)巴菲特，他肯定是一個(gè)“緊兇型”玩家。
You can pay too much even for a wonderful business and that the overpayment risk is currently quite high. The risk is time versus loss of principal. If you overpay, it will take time for the business value to catch up to the price paid.
你時(shí)常會(huì)買貴，甚至就一家很棒的公司而言，為其付太多溢價(jià)也是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很高的一件事情。這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是時(shí)間 vs. 本金損失。如果你買貴了，這家公司就需要花很多時(shí)間發(fā)展去追上你所付的價(jià)格。
旁注：這種事情在國(guó)內(nèi)的一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)基本上是天天發(fā)生，大家更傾向于去追逐一家公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，并不在乎付出遠(yuǎn)高于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值的價(jià)格，投機(jī)性很強(qiáng)地去期待下一個(gè)接盤俠出現(xiàn)。
Volatility is a huge plus to real investors.
波動(dòng)對(duì)于真正的價(jià)值投資者來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)附加好處。
Life is a whole series of opportunity costs. Munger asserted that all intelligent people base decisions on opportunity costs.
人生就是由一系列的機(jī)會(huì)成本組成。芒格斷言所有有智慧的人都是基于機(jī)會(huì)成本去做決策的。
Find people with brains, energy and integrity, and you can own the world.
找到有頭腦、有能量和正直的管理者，把錢投給他們，你就可以擁有全世界
There is no master plan. They will just keep allocating capital as rationally as they can.
伯克希爾沒(méi)有什么絕招，就是會(huì)一直堅(jiān)持盡可能理性地去分配資金。
Munger noted many corporations have large M&A departments spending huge amounts of time to do huge amounts of due diligence. Yet at least two-thirds of acquisitions are duds. In contrast, Munger noted that Berkshire has done many great deals with no such time spent. They wait for the no-brainer, the fat pitch.
芒格 提到很多大公司有巨大的投資并購(gòu)部門，花很多錢和時(shí)間去做盡職調(diào)查。但至少有2/3所做的并購(gòu)都掛了。相反，伯克希爾花了不多的時(shí)間做了不少很好的投資。因?yàn)樗麄儧](méi)有投資壓力，他們只等那些想都不用想的，垂手可得的好機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)了，才考慮出手。
There’s seldom one cockroach in the kitchen.
廚房里肯定不會(huì)只有一只蟑螂。
Buffett and Munger agreed that their biggest mistakes have been errors of omission rather than commission.
巴菲特和芒格都同意，他們犯過(guò)的最大的錯(cuò)誤其實(shí)是錯(cuò)過(guò)大機(jī)會(huì)，比那些投錯(cuò)的錯(cuò)誤要大多了。
If you focus on the price, you are really saying that you believe the market knows more than you do. If you think of the value of the business instead of the price, you will sleep better.
如果你只關(guān)注價(jià)格，那就說(shuō)明你覺(jué)得市場(chǎng)比你懂得多。如果你能去思考企業(yè)的內(nèi)在價(jià)值，你會(huì)睡得更好。
They suggested that investing is more like parimutuel betting, where you need only be right a few times as long as you don’t take a big loss.
投資就像賽馬中的同注分彩（贏家分享所有資金池），你只需要對(duì)幾次即可賺大錢，只要你每次錯(cuò)的時(shí)候輸?shù)亩疾欢唷?/span>
Most men would rather die than think. Many do.
很多人寧可去死也不愿意去思考。真的很多人。
Buffett summed up with regard to financial calamities: (1) don’t let it wipe you out, and (2) be prepared to take advantage.
巴菲特關(guān)于如何應(yīng)對(duì)金融災(zāi)難/危機(jī)總結(jié)了兩點(diǎn)：1.不要被洗出去 2.準(zhǔn)備好趁機(jī)占便宜。
Buffett summed up that speculative markets become like Cinderella at the ball. At midnight, they will turn to pumpkins and mice. Each player wants one more glass of champagne, one more dance, and then they’ll get out in time. But there are no clocks on the wall.
巴菲特說(shuō)投機(jī)市場(chǎng)很像灰姑娘的舞會(huì)。一到午夜時(shí)分，大家將會(huì)紛紛變回南瓜和老鼠。因此每一個(gè)玩家都想再喝一杯香檳，再跳一支舞，然后就趕在晚上12點(diǎn)前溜走。但問(wèn)題來(lái)了，墻上沒(méi)有鐘。
In 1790, there were four million people in America, 290 million in China and 100 million in Europe. Yet 215 years later, America has 30% of the world’s GDP.
1790年，美國(guó)僅有400萬(wàn)人口，中國(guó)有2.9億，歐洲有1億。但215年后，美國(guó)創(chuàng)造了全世界30%的GDP。
旁注：巴菲特把國(guó)家也看成是一個(gè)公司，這是為什么當(dāng)時(shí)他賭美國(guó)的原因。
“Any calls you get on Sunday, you’re going to make money.” Those rare calls are the best since they are inevitably from seriously distressed sellers.
“你在周日接到的任何電話，都可能讓你賺大錢” 這些電話可能是最好的交易，因?yàn)樗鼈兺悄切┮呀?jīng)走投無(wú)路的賣家打過(guò)來(lái)的。
旁注：哈哈，這個(gè)國(guó)內(nèi)可能有點(diǎn)不一樣，因?yàn)橹苋战拥降目赡苁歉鞣N營(yíng)銷電話...
The most important job of the board is to pick the right CEO.
董事會(huì)最重要的工作是挑選正確的CEO。
He claimed that his best ideas haven’t done better than others’ best ideas, but he’s lost less on his worst ideas.
巴菲特認(rèn)為他最好的投資不見(jiàn)得比別人的最好投資好，但他在自己最壞的那些投資上比絕大部分人損失都更少。
“Envy is the worst of the seven deadly sins. It’s the only one that makes you feel worse, and the other party feels nothing.
嫉妒是七宗罪里面最最差勁的。它是唯一一個(gè)讓你感覺(jué)極差，但對(duì)方完全無(wú)感的一宗罪。
The market is there to serve you, not influence you.
市場(chǎng)是為你服務(wù)的，不要被它所影響。
In thinking about markets, it is important to remember that markets are there to serve you, not instruct you. The key here is emotional stability, to have an inner peace about your decisions. It is important to think for yourself and to make good decisions over time. It is simple, but not easy.
關(guān)于市場(chǎng)的思考，最重要是記住它是服務(wù)于你的，而不是來(lái)對(duì)你指手畫(huà)腳的。這里的關(guān)鍵是穩(wěn)定的情緒，要對(duì)你的決策達(dá)到一個(gè)內(nèi)心的平靜。應(yīng)該專注于自己的利益和如何長(zhǎng)期去做正確決策。這聽(tīng)起來(lái)很簡(jiǎn)單，但做起來(lái)不容易。
Each business has its own key measures of building business value. What Buffett wants to pay for is widening the moat.
每一個(gè)生意都有自己不斷建立商業(yè)價(jià)值的關(guān)鍵衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，巴菲特想要的就是投錢去不斷擴(kuò)大這個(gè)生意的護(hù)城河。
Maintain low expectations – that is the key to happiness.
維持低預(yù)期是通往幸福的關(guān)鍵。
That’s the fundamental algorithm of life – REPEAT WHAT WORKS.
人生最最基礎(chǔ)的算法：不斷重復(fù)正確的操作。
We will always have bubbles because it is the nature of capitalism to go to excess.
我們會(huì)一直與泡沫共舞，因?yàn)檫@正是資本主義不斷創(chuàng)造剩余價(jià)值的本質(zhì)。
Berkshire would be ready and willing to act if some economic turbulence creates an opportunity.
伯克希爾會(huì)一直準(zhǔn)備好，并且非常愿意去抓那些由于經(jīng)濟(jì)重大動(dòng)蕩所產(chǎn)生的機(jī)會(huì)。
Clearly capital allocation will need to be the foremost talent.
非常清晰的資金分配能力將是（伯克希爾董事會(huì)挑選巴菲特繼任者時(shí)）最看重的才能。
最近讀了一本書(shū)叫University of Berkshire Hathaway，直譯就是《伯克希爾大學(xué)》，是作者Daniel Pecaut和Corey Wrenn過(guò)去30年參加伯克希爾股東年會(huì)的筆記。書(shū)里面記錄了大量巴菲特和芒格的語(yǔ)錄，流傳度完全不如那些雞湯語(yǔ)句，但句句珠璣。我又從這本筆記里翻譯了一些精華，跟大家分享，希望有助于我們反思很多一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)投資亂象，幫助我們更好地去做長(zhǎng)線投資。
PS. 英文好的同學(xué)還是直接讀原文，我的翻譯也做不到原汁原味。
We’ve had a very low opinion of our abilities.
我們認(rèn)為我們的能力很一般。
旁注：國(guó)內(nèi)很多普通投資人覺(jué)得自己很厲害。
The worst mistakes are made from the nicest graphs and what is really needed is enlightened common sense.
最糟糕的錯(cuò)誤往往從最漂亮的圖表得來(lái)，但其實(shí)真正需要的只是啟發(fā)性的常識(shí)。
旁注：經(jīng)常有人做個(gè)很漂亮的PPT，驚艷的圖表，最后要么騙別人、要么把自己繞進(jìn)去了。但卻忽視了真相往往只是常識(shí)的一個(gè)組合。
Knowing your limitations and the limitations of your information seems to be the key.
徹底了解自己的局限和自己所獲取信息的局限，這看起來(lái)是投資的關(guān)鍵。
旁注：很多人既不了解自己知道什么，更不了解自己不知道什么。
It’s hard enough to understand the culture you’ve been raised in, much less someone else’s.
想深入了解自己本土的文化已經(jīng)夠難了，更別說(shuō)別人的了。
旁注：現(xiàn)在有不少人去別的國(guó)家創(chuàng)業(yè)和投資，我覺(jué)得如果不是想做時(shí)間差的套利，而是做一些跟當(dāng)?shù)匚幕⑾⑾嚓P(guān)的領(lǐng)域，須謹(jǐn)慎。
We’d buy great businesses with excellent management at a fair to bargain price and leave them alone.
我們喜歡以一個(gè)公平、不錯(cuò)的價(jià)格去買已經(jīng)有優(yōu)秀管理團(tuán)隊(duì)的偉大生意，之后讓其獨(dú)立發(fā)展。
旁注：阿斗是永遠(yuǎn)扶不起的，投資人也幾乎不可能扭轉(zhuǎn)一家公司的局面。永遠(yuǎn)都只投可以自己解決自己?jiǎn)栴}的公司，融不到錢也要繼續(xù)想辦法前進(jìn)的創(chuàng)始人。
For the man with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.
對(duì)一個(gè)拿著錘子的人來(lái)說(shuō)，每個(gè)問(wèn)題看起來(lái)都像一枚釘子。
Buffett said that they know how to evaluate businesses. They do not know how to predict market swings. “It is crazy to give up something you know for something you do not.”
巴菲特說(shuō)他們知道如何去衡量一個(gè)生意，但不知道如何預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)的波動(dòng)。“為了一些你不知道的事情而放棄你所知道的事情，這太瘋狂了！”
旁注：不要嘗試去預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)，專注于如何去衡量目標(biāo)公司的內(nèi)在價(jià)值。
To think about what will happen versus when is a far more efficient way to behave.
去思考將會(huì)發(fā)生什么比什么時(shí)候會(huì)發(fā)生要有效率得多。
Diversification makes no sense for someone who knows what they are doing.
分散投資對(duì)于知道自己到底在投什么的人來(lái)說(shuō)是沒(méi)有任何意義的。
Three wonderful businesses is more than you need in this life and would serve you much better than 100 average businesses.
一輩子能投到3家很棒的公司比投100家一般的公司要強(qiáng)很多。
旁注：巴菲特其實(shí)是非常激進(jìn)的，他敢于在自己有把握的公司上下重注。如果用德州撲克的玩家類型去評(píng)價(jià)巴菲特，他肯定是一個(gè)“緊兇型”玩家。
You can pay too much even for a wonderful business and that the overpayment risk is currently quite high. The risk is time versus loss of principal. If you overpay, it will take time for the business value to catch up to the price paid.
你時(shí)常會(huì)買貴，甚至就一家很棒的公司而言，為其付太多溢價(jià)也是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)很高的一件事情。這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是時(shí)間 vs. 本金損失。如果你買貴了，這家公司就需要花很多時(shí)間發(fā)展去追上你所付的價(jià)格。
旁注：這種事情在國(guó)內(nèi)的一二級(jí)市場(chǎng)基本上是天天發(fā)生，大家更傾向于去追逐一家公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，并不在乎付出遠(yuǎn)高于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值的價(jià)格，投機(jī)性很強(qiáng)地去期待下一個(gè)接盤俠出現(xiàn)。
Volatility is a huge plus to real investors.
波動(dòng)對(duì)于真正的價(jià)值投資者來(lái)說(shuō)是一個(gè)附加好處。
Life is a whole series of opportunity costs. Munger asserted that all intelligent people base decisions on opportunity costs.
人生就是由一系列的機(jī)會(huì)成本組成。芒格斷言所有有智慧的人都是基于機(jī)會(huì)成本去做決策的。
Find people with brains, energy and integrity, and you can own the world.
找到有頭腦、有能量和正直的管理者，把錢投給他們，你就可以擁有全世界
There is no master plan. They will just keep allocating capital as rationally as they can.
伯克希爾沒(méi)有什么絕招，就是會(huì)一直堅(jiān)持盡可能理性地去分配資金。
Munger noted many corporations have large M&A departments spending huge amounts of time to do huge amounts of due diligence. Yet at least two-thirds of acquisitions are duds. In contrast, Munger noted that Berkshire has done many great deals with no such time spent. They wait for the no-brainer, the fat pitch.
芒格 提到很多大公司有巨大的投資并購(gòu)部門，花很多錢和時(shí)間去做盡職調(diào)查。但至少有2/3所做的并購(gòu)都掛了。相反，伯克希爾花了不多的時(shí)間做了不少很好的投資。因?yàn)樗麄儧](méi)有投資壓力，他們只等那些想都不用想的，垂手可得的好機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)了，才考慮出手。
There’s seldom one cockroach in the kitchen.
廚房里肯定不會(huì)只有一只蟑螂。
Buffett and Munger agreed that their biggest mistakes have been errors of omission rather than commission.
巴菲特和芒格都同意，他們犯過(guò)的最大的錯(cuò)誤其實(shí)是錯(cuò)過(guò)大機(jī)會(huì)，比那些投錯(cuò)的錯(cuò)誤要大多了。
If you focus on the price, you are really saying that you believe the market knows more than you do. If you think of the value of the business instead of the price, you will sleep better.
如果你只關(guān)注價(jià)格，那就說(shuō)明你覺(jué)得市場(chǎng)比你懂得多。如果你能去思考企業(yè)的內(nèi)在價(jià)值，你會(huì)睡得更好。
They suggested that investing is more like parimutuel betting, where you need only be right a few times as long as you don’t take a big loss.
投資就像賽馬中的同注分彩（贏家分享所有資金池），你只需要對(duì)幾次即可賺大錢，只要你每次錯(cuò)的時(shí)候輸?shù)亩疾欢唷?/span>
Most men would rather die than think. Many do.
很多人寧可去死也不愿意去思考。真的很多人。
Buffett summed up with regard to financial calamities: (1) don’t let it wipe you out, and (2) be prepared to take advantage.
巴菲特關(guān)于如何應(yīng)對(duì)金融災(zāi)難/危機(jī)總結(jié)了兩點(diǎn)：1.不要被洗出去 2.準(zhǔn)備好趁機(jī)占便宜。
Buffett summed up that speculative markets become like Cinderella at the ball. At midnight, they will turn to pumpkins and mice. Each player wants one more glass of champagne, one more dance, and then they’ll get out in time. But there are no clocks on the wall.
巴菲特說(shuō)投機(jī)市場(chǎng)很像灰姑娘的舞會(huì)。一到午夜時(shí)分，大家將會(huì)紛紛變回南瓜和老鼠。因此每一個(gè)玩家都想再喝一杯香檳，再跳一支舞，然后就趕在晚上12點(diǎn)前溜走。但問(wèn)題來(lái)了，墻上沒(méi)有鐘。
In 1790, there were four million people in America, 290 million in China and 100 million in Europe. Yet 215 years later, America has 30% of the world’s GDP.
1790年，美國(guó)僅有400萬(wàn)人口，中國(guó)有2.9億，歐洲有1億。但215年后，美國(guó)創(chuàng)造了全世界30%的GDP。
旁注：巴菲特把國(guó)家也看成是一個(gè)公司，這是為什么當(dāng)時(shí)他賭美國(guó)的原因。
“Any calls you get on Sunday, you’re going to make money.” Those rare calls are the best since they are inevitably from seriously distressed sellers.
“你在周日接到的任何電話，都可能讓你賺大錢” 這些電話可能是最好的交易，因?yàn)樗鼈兺悄切┮呀?jīng)走投無(wú)路的賣家打過(guò)來(lái)的。
旁注：哈哈，這個(gè)國(guó)內(nèi)可能有點(diǎn)不一樣，因?yàn)橹苋战拥降目赡苁歉鞣N營(yíng)銷電話...
The most important job of the board is to pick the right CEO.
董事會(huì)最重要的工作是挑選正確的CEO。
He claimed that his best ideas haven’t done better than others’ best ideas, but he’s lost less on his worst ideas.
巴菲特認(rèn)為他最好的投資不見(jiàn)得比別人的最好投資好，但他在自己最壞的那些投資上比絕大部分人損失都更少。
“Envy is the worst of the seven deadly sins. It’s the only one that makes you feel worse, and the other party feels nothing.
嫉妒是七宗罪里面最最差勁的。它是唯一一個(gè)讓你感覺(jué)極差，但對(duì)方完全無(wú)感的一宗罪。
The market is there to serve you, not influence you.
市場(chǎng)是為你服務(wù)的，不要被它所影響。
In thinking about markets, it is important to remember that markets are there to serve you, not instruct you. The key here is emotional stability, to have an inner peace about your decisions. It is important to think for yourself and to make good decisions over time. It is simple, but not easy.
關(guān)于市場(chǎng)的思考，最重要是記住它是服務(wù)于你的，而不是來(lái)對(duì)你指手畫(huà)腳的。這里的關(guān)鍵是穩(wěn)定的情緒，要對(duì)你的決策達(dá)到一個(gè)內(nèi)心的平靜。應(yīng)該專注于自己的利益和如何長(zhǎng)期去做正確決策。這聽(tīng)起來(lái)很簡(jiǎn)單，但做起來(lái)不容易。
Each business has its own key measures of building business value. What Buffett wants to pay for is widening the moat.
每一個(gè)生意都有自己不斷建立商業(yè)價(jià)值的關(guān)鍵衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，巴菲特想要的就是投錢去不斷擴(kuò)大這個(gè)生意的護(hù)城河。
Maintain low expectations – that is the key to happiness.
維持低預(yù)期是通往幸福的關(guān)鍵。
That’s the fundamental algorithm of life – REPEAT WHAT WORKS.
人生最最基礎(chǔ)的算法：不斷重復(fù)正確的操作。
We will always have bubbles because it is the nature of capitalism to go to excess.
我們會(huì)一直與泡沫共舞，因?yàn)檫@正是資本主義不斷創(chuàng)造剩余價(jià)值的本質(zhì)。
Berkshire would be ready and willing to act if some economic turbulence creates an opportunity.
伯克希爾會(huì)一直準(zhǔn)備好，并且非常愿意去抓那些由于經(jīng)濟(jì)重大動(dòng)蕩所產(chǎn)生的機(jī)會(huì)。
Clearly capital allocation will need to be the foremost talent.
非常清晰的資金分配能力將是（伯克希爾董事會(huì)挑選巴菲特繼任者時(shí)）最看重的才能。
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